Success and failure for hereditary Harrop formulae  by Harland, James
J. LOGIC PROGRAMMING 1993:17:1-29 1 
SUCCESS AND FAILURE FOR HEREDITARY 
HARROP FORMULAE 
JAMES HARLAND 
D We introduce the foundational issues involved in incorporating the 
NEGATION as FAILURE (NAF) rule into the framework of first-order 
hereditary Harrop formulae of Miller et al. This is a larger class of 
formulae than Horn clauses, and so the technicalities are more intricate 
than in the Horn clause case. As programs may grow during execution in 
this framework, the role of NAF and the CLOSED WORLD ASSUMP- 
TION (CWA) need some modification, and for this reason we introduce 
the notion of a completely defined predicate, which may be thought of as a 
localisation of the CWA. We also show how this notion may be used to 
define a notion of NAF for a more general class of goals than literals 
alone. We also show how an extensional notion of universal quantification 
may be incorporated. This makes our framework somewhat different from 
that of Miller et al., but not essentially so. We also show how to construct 
a Kripke-like model for the extended class of programs. This is essentially 
a denotational semantics for logic programs, in that it provides a mapping 
from the program to a pair of sets of atoms that denote the success and 
(finite) failure sets. This is inspired by the work of Miller on the semantics 
of first-order hereditary Harrop formulae. Note that no restriction on the 
class of programs is needed in this approach, and that our construction 
needs no more than o iterations. This necessitates a slight departure from 
the standard methods, but the important properties of the construction 
still hold. a 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The standard way to infer negative information from a logic program is to use the 
NEGATION as FAILURE (NAF) rule; that is, 4 succeeds if A fails 12,161. 
Clearly then the notions of success and failure will be mutually dependent in a 
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logic programming system using the NAF rule. The standard example of such a 
system is the class of normal programs, in which the body of each clause is a 
conjunction of literals. The notions of success and failure are determined opera- 
tionally via the notion of an SLDNF deriuation [12], in that an atom succeeds if it 
has a successful SLDNF derivation, and (finitely) fails if all SLDNF derivations are 
finitely failed. An SLDNF derivation may be thought of as being induced by the 
notion of an SLD derivation, in that a literal -+f succeeds if every SLDNF 
derivation of A is finitely failed, and so the success of 7A is determined by the 
failure of A. Thus the notion of an SLD or SLDNF derivation may be used to form 
two judgements: one that a given literal succeeds (as the derivation is successful) 
and the other that a given literal fails (as all derivations are finitely failed). 
Whilst Horn clauses are Turing-complete [18], there is considerable interest in 
extending the basic formalism to include more expressive constructs than is 
permitted in the Horn clause framework. However, it is not always clear how the 
NAF rule may be applied in some of these extensions. For example, for systems in 
which programs may grow and/or shrink during execution [7,13,14,15], the notion 
of failure may change with time due to changes in the program, and so the notion 
of negation may change. As pointed out in [7], this does not coincide with the usual 
notion of negation in mathematical logic, essentially because the NAF rule is not 
monotonic; that is, if P E +I, then it does not necessarily follow that P’ F 4 
where P G P’. Hence, the treatment of NAF in such systems requires careful 
analysis. 
Another point of interest is that the notion of failure for an existentially 
quantified goal should presumably imply something about the success of a univer- 
sally quantified goal. Because some logic programming systems [15] allow univer- 
sally quantified formulae as goals, it would seem that such systems provide a 
framework pertinent to the study of NAF, in that the notion of success for a 
universally quantified goal should be the dual, in some sense, of the notion of 
success for an existentially quantified goal. 
In this paper we explore such issues of success and failure for a class of 
formulae known as hereditary Hurrop formulae [15]. Such formulae permit both 
universal and existential quantifiers as well as implications in goal formulae, 
making the treatment of the NAF rule in this system rather intricate. Whilst our 
treatment stresses the role of negation, we also discuss the notion of success for 
universally quantified goals, and show how there are (at least) two such notions 
that are of interest, which may be classified as intensional and extensional. The 
main difference is that the latter notion may use knowledge about the language of 
the program in order to make inferences, whereas the former may not. Whilst the 
former approach is the “standard” method used in mathematical logic, the latter 
approach seems most appealing from a logic programming point of view because it 
is quite common to assume that all terms come from a known set, known as the 
Herbrand universe. 
An interesting consequence of this discussion is that for the extensional notion 
of universal quantification to be feasible, it seems natural to consider not only the 
ground instances of the program (which is common practice in logic programming 
semantics), but also instances of the program that may contain variables. As we 
shall see, this essentially requires that the success of universally quantified goals be 
“compact”, in that the success of the quantified goal depends on the success of 
only a finite number of instances of the goal. Hence, the failure of an existentially 
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quantified goal is similarly compact, and so no more than w iterations are needed 
to decide the truth of a given goal. This contrasts with the standard notion of 
failure in logic programming semantics. For example, consider the program 
If, as is the standard practice, we only consider the ground instances of the 
program, then in order to come to the conclusion that q fails it is necessary to 
perform w iterations (such as the aP operator of Fitting 141) to determine that 
p(t) succeeds for every ground term t, and hence o + 1 iterations to determine 
that 3x 7 p(x) (and hence q) fails. However, if we consider all instances of the 
program, and not just the ground instances, we find that after w iterations there 
are still instances of p(x) that have not been shown to fail, and 3x 7 p(x) does not 
fail in this case. Hence, a more subtle analysis of the notion of success and failure, 
which is required for the incorporation of universally quantified goals, may shed 
some interesting light on the notion of failure for normal programs. 
Another issue of some technical significance is the use of the NAF rule in the 
presence of implications in goals. As the execution of such goals may involve 
adding clauses to the program, the notion of failure may change during execution, 
making the use of the NAF rule somewhat more intricate. As we shall see, this will 
involve the notion of a completely defined predicate, i.e., one for which it will be 
safe to apply the NAF rule, because we assume that such predicates should not be 
extended. 
Having introduced these operational notions, it seems natural to turn to the 
question of a corresponding model-theoretic notion of consequence. Traditionally 
in logic programming this has been done by means of a continuous operator on a 
complete lattice, which thus has a least fixed point. This fixed point is then used as 
a “canonical” model of the program, in that an atom A is a (proof-theoretic) 
consequence of the program iff A is true in this model. Hence, we may think of 
this approach as a denotational semantics for logic programs, in that given a 
program P, this construction provides us with a method of finding a set of atoms 
that may be considered as the “meaning” of the program, in that the program is 
considered to be a shorthand for this set of atoms. Given that a construction along 
these lines has been given by Miller [14] for a large fragment of hereditary Harrop 
formulae, it would seem that such fixed point methods would be appropriate for 
our task. 
One point to note is that in the case when NAF is involved, we generally wish to 
think of the denotational semantics of the program as two sets of atoms-one for 
the set of atoms that succeeds and the other for the set of atoms that (finitely) fails. 
Hence, our approach should presumably be more in the spirit of the three-valued 
approaches 14,101. Thus our construction will be similar in spirit to that of [14], but 
will be somewhat more intricate, because there is more than one set of atoms 
involved. We define a Tp operator in the traditional way, and it is not hard to show 
that the operator involved is, in fact, continuous, but only on a complete semilat- 
tice, rather than a complete lattice. This makes it less than trivial to find the least 
fixed point of this operator, but it is still straightforward. We then show that the 
model-theoretic notion of consequence corresponds to the operational one, a 
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result that may be interpreted as showing the “compactness” of the operational 
notion. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the 
foundational issues involved in adding negation to the framework of first-order 
hereditary Harrop formulae, and we discuss our motivation for interpreting univer- 
sal quantifiers extensionally, as well as the role of the NEGATION as FAILURE 
(NAF) rule in our setting. In Section 3 we present the formal extensions necessary 
to incorporate the foregoing features, and define a notion of operational provabil- 
ity. We then consider model-theoretic issues-in particular, the problem of finding 
a model-theoretic notion of consequence that corresponds to the proof-theoretic 
notion introduced previously. In Section 4 we discuss the framework of [14], on 
which our work is based, and the preliminary technicalities of our approach, and in 
the following section we define the appropriate notion of consequence and present 
some basic results. In Section 6 we present our fixed point construction, and show 
that it indeed captures the notion of consequence we desire. Finally in Section 7 we 
present our conclusions and discuss some possibilities for further work. 
2. PRELIMINARIES 
The definitions of D and G formulae given in [15] are as follows: 
D:=AIVxDID, A D,]G xA, 
G:=A]VxG]3xGIG, A G,lG, v G,lD 3 G. 
The addition of negated atoms to goals requires that we extend the definition of 
a G formula to include the case --JA. The definition of the G formulae that reflects 
this follows. 
Definition 2.1. A definite formula D and a goal formula G are defined via: 
D:=AIVxDID, A D,lG x/I, 
G:=A(~AlVxGI3xGIG, A G,lG, V G,ID 1G. 
We denote by 9 the set of all D formulae, and denote the set of all G formulae 
by 5. In order to avoid confusion with the class of formulae of [14], we will refer to 
such definite and goal formulae as D,,,_ and G,,,_ formulae, respectively. 
There are two important points to note about the use of this class of formulae as 
a logic programming language. 
First, one feature of logic programming is that we usually consider the set of all 
closed terms, called the Herbrand universe and which is here denoted as ZY, as a 
set that is fixed prior to the writing of a program, and hence is constant throughout 
the computation process. For simplicity, we assume that the Herbrand universe is 
not empty. We usually think of this set of terms as being generated by a finite 
number of symbols, i.e., a signature, and so it seems natural to associate a 
signature with a particular program. Often the signature of a program is taken to 
contain exactly the function and constant symbols that appear in the program. In 
our case, we will assume that the signature must contain such symbols, but need 
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not be limited to them. For example, consider the program 
Vx non-zero( s( x)). 
It is clear that non-zero(s”(0)) succeeds for all it 2 1, and that non-zero(O) fails. 
Clearly we wish the latter goal to fail, rather than produce a type error or 
something similar. Hence we need the external knowledge provided by the signa- 
ture in order to have the correct “view” of the information in the program. This 
also makes it clear what to do with a goal such as non-zeroMa)), which would 
otherwise succeed. 
Given that we think of the Herbrand universe in this way, it seems natural to 
interpret universal quantifiers extensionally; i.e., that Vxp(x> should succeed pre- 
cisely when p(t) succeeds for every term r in the Herbrand universe. However, this 
is at variance with the standard practice in first-order logic. For example, let the 
Herbrand universe be {a, f(a), f(f<a>>, . . . ) and consider the program P: 
P(a) 
~xP(fw. 
According to the standard rule, we only have P I- Vxp(x> when P Fp(y) for 
some “new” variable y, and yet it is clear that for every term t in the Herbrand 
universe P t-p(t). We may think of this as requiring that universally quantified 
conclusions be independent of the language of the program. In our case, we want 
the success of universally quantified goals to reflect the fact that we are dealing 
with a known Herbrand universe, and so we will require something slightly 
different, i.e., that a universally quantified goal succeeds precisely when all of its 
instances succeed. However, we will still retain the “compactness” of the previous 
version, in that success of a universally quantified goal will only depend on the 
success of a finite number of instances, and hence describes a feasible search 
operation. The precise details of how this is done are given in what follows. 
The second important point to note is that the NEGATION as FAILURE 
(NAF) rule relies on the information in the program being complete. For example, 
the append predicate is complete in the sense that there is no additional clause we 
can insert that would correctly extend the append relation; all the information we 
ever want to consider about appending lists together is given, and so it is correct to 
apply NAF. Thus we may think of the append predicate as given as completely 
defined: 
vx append( [ I, x,x> 
Vx’JyVzb‘w append( x.y, z, x.w) c append( y, z, w). 
On the other hand, not every predicate will have such a complete definition. For 
example, a predicate containing information about carcinogens we would wish to 
consider incompletely dejined, because it is possible that our list of carcinogens is 
not complete. Thus whilst we wish to be able to prove -,append([ I, [1,2],[3]) from 
the failure of the goal append([ ],[1,2], [3]), we may be undecided whether to 
conclude ~carcinogen(chocolate) from the failure of the goal carcinogen(choco- 
late). In this way we may classify each definition in the program as completely or 
incompletely defined, i.e., suitable for NAF or not. 
Now for Horn clauses, there are no technical problems with this approach. We 
may assume, explicitly or otherwise, that all predicates in the program are com- 
pletely defined, and hence use NAF for all predicates. However, for hereditary 
Harrop formulae, goals may contain embedded implications, and so we may 
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perform hypothetical reasoning. For example, given the goal p I G, we add the 
predicate p to the program, and then evaluate the goal G with respect to the 
larger program. 
This process seems somewhat incompatible with the notion of a completely 
defined predicate. As pointed out by Gabbay [7], mixing the notions of NAF and 
embedded implications can cause the rule of modus ponens to fail. Hence, it would 
seem natural to insist that not only must a predicate be completely defined before 
we can apply the NAF rule to it, but also that a predicate must be incompletely 
defined before we can add to its definition in the program. Thus we syntactically 
separate the predicates for which we may use NAF from those for which we may 
use embedded implication. 
Hence, when it comes to defining programs, we will require that programs 
consist of more than just a set of closed definite clauses, because we need to know 
which predicates are completely defined. In fact, we will include a pair of disjoint 
sets of predicate names as part of the program, where the first set of names are the 
predicates that are incompletely defined, and the second are the completely 
defined predicates. This allows us to make some significant technical simplifica- 
tions. Whilst we insist that the two sets be disjoint, it is not necessary that the two 
sets cover all predicate names, because there may be some predicates whose status 
is somewhat unclear (i.e. it is possible that the definition is complete, but we do not 
know that it is complete). Thus the first set of names may be thought of as those 
predicates for which we know our information is incomplete, and hence it is 
reasonable to extend the definition of such predicates during execution of the 
program, but not to apply the NAF rule to them. On the other hand, the 
completely defined predicates may use the NAF rule, but their definitions may not 
be extended. 
This leads us to the definition of a program that follows. 
Definition 2.2. Given an atom A =p(tl, . . . , t,), we define name(A) =p, and for 
any formula F, names(F) = {name( AlI A appears in F}. 
We say an atom A appears positively (negatively) in a formula F as follows: 
l A appears positively in A. 
l A appears positively (negatively) in F, V F2 iff A appears positively (nega- 
tively) in either Fl or F2. 
l A appears positively (negatively) in F, A F2 iff A appears positively (nega- 
tively) in either F, or F2. 
l A appears positively (negatively) in 3xF iff A appears positively (negatively) 
in F. 
l A appears positively (negatively) in VxF iff A appears positively (negatively) 
in F. 
l A appears positively (negatively) in Fl 3 F2 iff A appears positively (nega- 
tively) in F2 or A appears negatively (positively) in F,. 
l A appears positively (negatively) in 7F iff A appears positively (negatively) 
in F. 
The preceding definition is used to determine the “parity” of an atom A in 
regard to implications. For example, p(a) occurs positively in (--IP( A q(b), but 
negatively in p(a) 3 q(b). 
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Note that whilst we are ultimately interested in the properties of programs and 
goals (in which there are no free variables), in general we will need to consider sets 
of definite formulae and goal formulae that are not closed. This is due to the 
occurrence of universal quantifiers and implications in goals, which means that 
during computation we cannot restrict attention purely to closed goal formulae or 
closed definite formulae. For this reason we introduce the notion of a detiuation 
state. 
Definition 2.3. A derivation state is a pair (D, N >, where D is a set of definite 
formulae and N is a pair (N,, N, ), where N, c names0 and Ni f~ N2 = 0, and 
which satisfies: For all atoms A and B such that name(A) E N2, G 3A is a 
definite formula appearing in D, and B occurs in G, then: 
l If B occurs positively in G, then name(B) E N2. 
l If B occurs negatively in G, then name(B) E Ni. 
If N = (N,, N2), we say ass(N) = N,, den(N) = N2. 
A program is a derivation state (D, N > in which D is a set of closed 
definite formulae. 
We denote the set of all programs by 9. When N is the pair (names(D), 0a>, we 
often write the program as just D. As previously mentioned, we may think of D as 
either a set of closed definite formulae or as a set of clauses. 
The restrictions on the occurrences of atoms in the bodies of the clauses of 
completely defined predicates ensure that completely defined predicates may only 
depend on the success of other completely defined predicates and the assumption 
of incompletely defined predicates. For example, given the clause 
P =(r=q), 
if den(N) contains p, then it must contain q and ass(N) must contain r. 
Clearly this property of programs will be maintained throughout execution 
provided that additions to the program only extend incompletely defined predi- 
cates. 
We shall find the following definition useful. 
Definition 2.4. Let G be a G,,,_ g oal formula. We say G is negatable iff all 
predicates that occur positively in G are completely defined and all predicates 
that occur negatively in G are incompletely defined. 
In the next section we will show how we can use these notions to define an 
operational notion of consequence. 
3. OPERATIONAL PROVABILITY 
To use the class of programs introduced in the previous section as a logic 
programming language, we need to provide a notion of operational provability. We 
will do so by introducing two relations kS and kf , where the former is used to 
indicate success and hence will be similar to the k. relation of [141, and the latter 
is used to indicate failure. There will be some interplay between the two relations 
because we wish to identify P I-$ 
defined predicate. 
~4 with P ~~ A when name(A) is a completely 
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As previously mentioned, we are interested in validity with respect to a given set 
of ground terms ?Y. In the presence of the NEGATION as FAILURE rule, this 
raises some compactness problems. For example, it seems natural to state that the 
goal 3x p(x) fails iff p(t) fails for each t E YY. However, this can lead to some 
technical complications, and is somewhat at variance with what happens in Prolog. 
Consider the program 
where the Herbrand universe is (0, s(O), s(s(O)), . . .}. According to the rule just 
mentioned, q fails. However, a Prolog system will not return an answer for the goal 
q. The problem is that we need more than w steps in order to show that 4 fails. 
Whilst this in itself is not an insurmountable problem, it seems more appropriate 
(and more elegant) to alter the definition of failure so that q neither fails nor 
succeeds. Hence we will need an extra condition, in that not only must we have 
that every ground instance p(t) of p(x) fails, but also that they do so compactly, 
i.e., that there is a finite set of instances that fail, and the failure of this finite set of 
instances implies the failure of all ground instances. For this reason we will need to 
consider arbitrary terms, and not just ground terms, in the definition of failure for 
existentially quantified goals. A formal definition follows. 
We will assume that the number of symbols in the Herbrand universe is finite, 
and so we may associate a signature with 2Y. This signature will be denoted as C. 
We also assume the existence of a countably infinite set of variables disjoint 
from the set of constants and function symbols of all signatures. 
Definition 3.1. Let 2 be a signature containing at least one constant symbol. 
Terms are defined as follows: 
l A variable or a constant in I; is a term. 
l If f is an n-ary function symbol in 2 and t,, . . . , t, are terms, then f(tl,. . . , t,> 
is a term. 
l Nothing else is a term. 
The Herbrand universe % is the set of all ground terms that may be formed 
from the symbols in C. 
We denote by 7 the set of all terms that may be formed from the symbols 
in Z. 
Note that ?Z! is the set of all ground terms, whereas 77s the set of all terms. We 
think of each of the variables appearing in a term in Yas ranging over elements of 
Z!‘, so that we think of Yas a more sophisticated representation of the same set of 
terms. Thus the nonground terms in Ydo not have any deep meaning; they merely 
act as place holders. 
As mentioned, we wish to define the failure of existentially quantified goals (and 
also the success of universally quantified goals) by way of a finite set of “repre- 
sentative” instances, rather than by way of all ground instances (which is generally 
infinite). In order so to do, we introduce the notion of a representation. 
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Definition 3.2. A covering set of 2Y is a set of terms T such that t E Z iff t is a 
ground instance of a term t’ E T. 
A minimal covering set is a covering set of which no proper subset is a covering 
set. 
A representation of Z is a finite minimal covering set of 2Y. 
We refer to the set of all representations of Y as 5%‘(24. 
We may now state that 3xG fails if there is a representation R such that G[t/xl 
fails for all t E R. This essentially guarantees a continuity property, in that 3xG 
only fails when there is a finite set of instances of G that fails. Consider again the 
preceding example. Because any representation must contain a term of the form 
s”(y) for some n, for 3~~4x1 to fail we must have that p(y) fails. However, it 
seems that any reasonable definition of failure would not allow p(y) to fail in this 
instance because it “matches” a clause in the program that generates the same 
goal. Hence, because p(y) does not fail (even though every ground instance of it 
does), 3xp(x) does not fail. 
We will define the success of universally quantified goals in a similar way, i.e., 
that VxG succeeds iff there is a representation R such that G[t/x] succeeds for all 
t E R. Note that because a term in a representation may contain variables, we will 
have to consider the possibility that variables may occur in atoms, and, hence, take 
this into account in the definition of success and failure for atoms. As we desire the 
failure of G[t/x] for all t E R to be at least as strong a condition as the failure of 
G[t/x] for all t E %Y(, it seems natural to expect that the former property implies the 
latter. Similarly, it seems natural to expect that if G[t/x] succeeds for all t E R, 
then G[t/x] succeeds for all t E ~2. Thus the success or failure of the instances of 
an atom shall be our guiding intuition in the relevant definitions of success and 
failure, and so it seems natural to adopt the policy that an atom succeeds if every 
instance of it succeeds, and an atom fails if every instance of it fails. However, this 
is not quite sufficient for our purposes. Ultimately, we are interested in the validity 
of sentences, i.e., whether a given set of closed definite formulae implies a given 
closed goal formula. Free variables and the like are merely tools used in the 
derivation process. Hence, we are not interested in the validity of formulae 
containing free variables per se, but only in using the success or failure of such 
formulae to determine the validity of sentences. Thus we know that any free 
variable in a derivation must be introduced by a quantifier, which allows us to 
simplify the definition of success for an atom. For example, let I: be (a/O,f/l} [so 
that the Herbrand universe consists of a, f(a), f2(a), . . . I, and consider the program 
Because p(a) and p(f(y)) succeed, we have that Vxp(x) succeeds. On the other 
hand, it is less clear what we should expect for p(z). It is clear that every (proper) 
instance of p(z) succeeds [i.e., that p(a) and p(f(y)) succeed for any y], which 
suggests that p(z) should succeed. However, this means that the definition of 
success for an atom may be somewhat complicated because we may have to “split” 
p(z) into a number of instances. This also means that for a goal such as Vxp(x) 
there are two “layers” of universal quantification-one being the explicit quantifier 
and the other being the implicit quantification given by the occurrence of free 
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variables in terms such as p(f(y)). H ence, we shall define the success of an atom 
as before and in [14], i.e., in terms of the atom itself, rather than its instances. Thus 
in the preceding example, b’xp(x) succeeds, but p(z) does not. In this way, the 
definition of success and failure for atoms may appear to be somewhat asymmetric, 
but because we are ultimately interested only in closed formulae, this will not be of 
great concern. 
Note that the traditional definition of success for VxG may be thought of as 
utilizing only the representation {y} of Y. Thus our definition of success for VxG 
seems a natural extension when considering validity with respect to a given 
Herbrand universe. 
The definitions of kS and kf follow. For technical reasons, these are not 
defined (only) over 9 x .Y, but over the pairs ((D, N),G), where (D, N) is a 
derivation state and G is a goal formula. Note that neither D nor G need be 
closed here. We will refer to such pairs as deriuafion pairs. 
Definition 3.3. Let D be a definite formula. We define ID] by cases as follows: 
IAl = {A}, 
IG 3Al = {G IA}. 
Let 9 be a set of definite formulae. Then we define 
IBI= u IDI. 
D& 
We denote by A a B the statement hat A is an instance of B. 
Definition 3.4. Let (P, G) be a derivation pair where P = CD, N). Let 
match (A) = {G 2 B E 1Dls;t.B a A}. An O-derivation is a tree built using the 
following rules: 
P++ G 
P++A 
, where G IA E IDI, 
VBEIDI, B$AVG1BBmatch(A)P+- G 
P--A 
I 
P+-A 
P++ lA 
where name(A) E den(N), pp~‘~A1 
P++ G, P++ G, P+- Gi 
P++G,r\G, ’ P+- G, AG,’ 
i = 1,2, 
P-++ Gi P+- G, P--- G, 
P++ G, VG,’ 
i = 1,2, 
P+-G,VG, ’ 
HEREDITARY HARROP FORMULAE 11 
P ++ G[ t/x] 
for some r E %‘, 
P -- G[ t/x]‘& E R 
P-1+ 3xG P--- 3xG 
for some 
R+z%‘W’), 
P ++ G[ t/x]Vt E R 
P ++ VxG 
for some R EL%T~Y/), 
P+- G[t/x] 
P+- VxG 
for some t E Z!‘, 
P,Dj+ G P,D+- G 
P-++ DIG’ P+- DIG’ 
where the cases P ++ VxG and P +- 3xG have the side condition that no 
variable in R occurs free in P or G and the last two rules have the side condition 
that names(heads(D)) c ass(N). 
A sequent P ++ G is called a positive sequent, and a sequent 
a negatice sequent. 
A positive sequent P ++ G is initial if G is an atom A and A 
sequent P +- G is initial if G is an atom A and we have 
and VG XB E IDI, B&A. 
P +- G is called 
E (DI. A negative 
VB E IDI, B @A, 
An O-proof is an O-derivation whose root is positive and whose leaves are 
initial. 
An O-denial is an O-derivation whose root is negative and whose leaves are 
initial. 
We may think of proofs in this system as trees whose nodes are sequents, where 
each subtree is classified as either a “success” subtree or a “fail” subtree, and so 
this is a generalisation of the concept of an SLDNF tree 1121. 
Note the case for negation for -++ , which ensures that the NAF rule is only 
applied to completely defined predicates of P, i.e., those whose names appear in 
den(N). We do not insist on the same restriction for the failure of TA because it 
seems reasonable for TA to fail whenever A succeeds, regardless of whether 
name(A) is a completely defined predicate or not. Because negation is only applied 
to literals, all this does is allow more things to fail than would be the case 
otherwise. For example, given the program P = ( p, ({p}, 0>>, we have that P t, p, 
and so it seems reasonable that we have that P kf up, even though p is not 
completely defined. Thus the success of an atom implies the failure of its negation, 
but the failure of an atom does not necessarily imply the success of its negation. 
Note also that the implication rule has to be slightly modified so that only 
predicates in ass(N) may be extended. There may be less restrictive ways of dealing 
with this problem; this way ensures that only assumptions known to be consistent 
with the program are allowed to be made, and that a goal of the form D 2 G for 
which D is an extension of the definition of a predicate not in ass(N) is 
computationally indeterminate. Without this restriction, computation of the goal 
append([ I,[ 1,[1,2,31) 1 G from the standard append program (i.e., the two stan- 
dard clauses with append being completely defined) involves a program that 
extends the definition of append, and so it is not obvious what the computational 
behaviour should be. We do not pursue this problem here; for now, we note that 
the present way of dealing with the problem is “safe”, in that inconsistencies of this 
kind are avoided. 
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It should also be noted that this form of the implication rule is not a conserva- 
tive extension of the implication rule for I-, [14], in that it is not the case that 
(p up, (0,(p))) kS p xp, due to the fact that p is completely defined, and hence 
the antecedent of the goal cannot be added to the program. However, it is not hard 
to see that for a program P = (D, N) and a goal G in which all predicates that 
occur negatively in G are in ass(N) that D I-~ G implies that P I--~ G. In particular, 
if G is a goal in which all negatively occurring predicates are in ass(N) and positive 
occurrences of a universal quantifier are not allowed in goals, it should be clear 
that D kO G iff P ~~ G. Hence ass(N) may be used to identify formulae for which 
ks conservatively extends kO . We shall see how this device is useful later. 
Clearly, a conservative extension is desirable and would simplify the definitions of 
kS and I--~, but raises some difficult problems for the model theory. Because it 
seems problematic for the model theory to cope with extensions to completely 
defined predicates, we place this restriction here to avoid considering cases that are 
semantically meaningless. We may think of this restriction (i.e., that predicates 
occurring in a negative position in a goal must appear in ass(N) for the goal to 
succeed or fail) as insisting that additions to the program must be known to be 
consistent with the program, just as we insist that to use NAF, we must know that 
the predicate involved cannot be consistently extended. In this way this restriction, 
whilst somewhat undesirable, does seem to be in keeping with our approach. 
Note that there are programs and goals for which neither P I-, G nor P tf G. 
For example, if P = (p up, (0,0)) and G =p, then it is clear that P W, p and 
PFfP. 
The following proposition shows how kS and t--f may be thought of in a more 
inductive style. 
Proposition 3.1. Let (D, N) be a derivation state. Then 
l (D, N) t--$ A iffA E IDI or 3G IA E IDI such that (D, N) ~~ G. 
l (D, N) I-~ 7A iff (D, N) ~~ A and name(A) E den(N). 
l (D,N)t--,G,VG, ifS(D,N)~,G, or (D,N)F,G,. 
l (D,N)t-,G,r\G, ifS(D,N)F,G, and(D,N)F,G,. 
l (D,N)t--, ~xGiff(D,N)~,G[t/x] forsometE%. 
l (D, N) t-,VxG iff 3R ES(FYZ/) such that (D, N) kS G[t/xl for all t E R, 
where no variable in R appears free in D or G. 
l (D,N) t-S D’xG~~S(DU{D’},N) k,Gandnames(heads(D’))cass(N). 
l (D,N)~-~AifSVB~lDlB$AandtlG~B~lD]suchthatBaA,(D,N) 
~~ G. 
l (D,N)$ 7A ifs (D, N) F$ A. 
l (D, N) ~~ G, v G, iff (D, N) kf G, and (D, N) t--f G,. 
l (D, N) kf G, A G, ifs (D, N) t--f G, or (D, N) Ff G,. 
l (D, N) t-f 3xG iff 3R ES%‘(%) such that (D, N) t--f G[t/xl for all t E R, 
where no variable in R appears free in D or G. 
l (D, N) kf VxG iff (D, N) kf G[t/x] for some t E Z. 
l (D,N) kf D’xG iff(D u{D’),N) kf G andnames(heads(D’))cass(N). 
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It is easy to see that the success (failure) of a goal implies the success (failure) of 
each of its ground instances. This is formally stated in the following proposition. 
Proposition 3.2. Let ( P, G) be a derication pair where P = (D, N ). Then 
1. P t--s G - P[t/x] t, G[t/x] for any t E %. 
2. P ~~ G * P[t/x] ~~ G[t/xl for any t E Z!. 
PROOF. We proceed by induction on the depth of the relevant O-derivation. In the 
base case, G is an atom A. 
1. Because the sequent is initial, A E IDl, and hence A[t/x] E lD[t/x]l for any 
t, i.e., P[t/x] kS A[t/x] for any t E %. 
2. Because the sequent is initial, VB E ]DlB $A and VG 2 B E ID], B +A, and 
hence VB E lD[t/x]lB qkA[t/x] and VG XB E lD[t/x]l, B &A[t/x] for any t, 
i.e., P[t/x] k.f A[t/x] for any t E FY. 
Hence the induction hypothesis is that the proposition holds when the relevant 
O-derivation is of no more than a given depth. There are six cases, many of which 
are similar, and so we only present the argument -for the cases A and VyG: 
A: 1. If the base case does not hold, then we have 3G IA E ID] such that 
P kS G, and hence G[t/x] xA[t/x] E lD[t/x]l, and by the hypothesis 
P[t/xl k-s G[t/xl, and so P[t/x] t, &t/x]. 
2. If the base case does not hold, then we have VB E IDI B $A and 
VG 3 B E IDI such that B aA, P k-f G, and by the hypothesis, P[t/xl 
t- G[t/x] for any t E %. Hence, VG’ 1 B’ E ID[t/x]I such that B’ a 
A t/x], we have P[t/x] kf G’, and as before VB E I D[t/x]l B qk A[t/x], i 
and so P[t/x] ~~ At/x] for any t E ZY. 
VyG: 1. P ~~ VyG iff 3R E~YY) such that P ~~ G[t’/y] for all t’ E R and by 
the hypothesis, P[t/x] ~~ G[t’/y][t/x] for any t E ?Y, and because t’ 
cannot contain x, we have P[t/x] kS (VyG)[t/x] for any t E %,. 
2. P it VyG iff P kf G[t’/y] for some t’ E 72 and by the hypothesis, 
P[t/x] ~~ G[t’/y][t/x] for any t E 2Y, and so P[t/x] ~~ (VyG)[t/x] for 
any t E 2?l. 0 
A possibly surprising result is that there is a weak dual to Proposition 3.2, in that 
for QY,, P ro g rams, if a representative set of instances of a goal fails, then so do 
all sets of representative instances, including the goal itself. This result is shown in 
the following text. 
Proposition 3.3. Let ( P, G) be a D,,, derivation pair where P = (D, N >. Let 
R ES(%) be such that the terms in R do not contain any variables that occur free 
or bound in P or G, and t’ ~7 be such that no uan’able in t’ occurs bound in P or 
G. Then 
P[t/x].t-fG[t/x] foraZltER-P[t’/x]kfG[t’/x]. 
PROOF. We proceed by induction on the depth of the O-derivation of P[t/x] kf 
G[t/xl. 
Let R = {t 1,. . . , t,). In the base case, G is an atom A. Because P[t;/xl I--~ A[t;/xl 
for each i, we have VB E lD[t,/xll, B $A[tJx] and VG IB E ]D[t,/x]l, B $A[t;/x] 
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for each i. Let B E lD[r’/x]l, and so B = B’[t’/xl for some B’, i.e., B’[t’/xl E 
lD[t’/x]l, and so B’[rJx] E lD[r,/x]l. If B’[t’/xl aA[r’/xl, then B’[rJxl aA[tJxl 
for any i, which is a contradiction, and so B’[r’/xl $A[r’/xl. Now let G 2 B E 
lD[r’/x]l, and so G 2 B = G’[t’/x] 1 B’[r’/x] for some G’ 3 B’, i.e., G'[r'/xl 3 
B’[r’/x] E lD[r’/x]l, and so G’[rJx] 3 B’[r;/x] E lD[ri/xll. If B’[r’/xl aA[r’/xl, then 
B’[r;/x] aA[rJx] for any i, which is a contradiction, and so B’[r’/xl qjrA[r’/x]. 
Hence VB E lD[r’/xll, B q!tA[r’/xl, and VG 3 B E lD[r’/xll, B +A[r’/xl, and so 
P[r’/x] t--f G[r’/x]. Hence, we assume that the proposition is true for all O-deriva- 
tions of no more than a given depth. There are six cases, and again many of them 
are similar, and so we only present the argument for the cases A and VyG. 
A: If the base case does not hold, then P[r,/x] I--~ A[r,/xl iff VB E 
I~[~i/xllB qirAt,/xl and VG 2 B E lD[ri/x]l such that B a A[r,/xl, 
P[rJx] I--~ G. As before, if B E ID[r’/x]I, we cannot have B a Ai[r'/xl, 
and so we have that B #tA[r’/x] VB E ID[r’/x]I. Let GIBE lD[r’/xll, 
and as before G 1 B = G’[r’/x] 3 B’[r’/x] for some G’ 2 B’, i.e., G’[r’/xl 
3 B’[r’/x] E lD[r’/x]l. If B’[r’/x] aA[r’/x], then G’[r,/xl3 B’[r,/xl E 
lD[r;/x]l and B’[r,/x] aA[r,/x] for all i. Hence we have that P[r,/xl t--f 
G’[r,/x] for all i, and by the hypothesis we have P[r’/xl Ff G’[r’/xl. 
Hence, VB E ID[r’/x]lB #tA[r’/x] and VG 13 B E lD[r’/xll such that B a 
A[r’/x], P[r’/x] kf G, i.e., P[r’/x] kf A[r’/x]. 
VyG: P[r/x] I-~ (VyG)[r/x] iff P[r/x] ~~ G[r/x][r”/yl for some rN E Z!, and 
because r does not contain y, by the hypothesis P[r’/xl kf G[r”/yl[r’/xl 
for some r” E fY(, i.e., P[r’/xl I-~ (VyG)[r’/xl. 0 
Note that a corresponding result does nor hold for ~~ . Consider the program 
p(a) 
VxPcf(x)). 
Now {a,f(y)] is 
does not succeed. 
a representation, and p(a) and p(f(y)) both succeed, but p(y) 
This result cannot be extended to D,,,_ formulae either, 
because for the preceding program, up does not fail, although Tp(a) and 
~p(f(y)) both do. Full discussion of this point is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Further discussion may be found in [9]. 
The intuitive reading of P kS G and P t-f G may be given as “G succeeds” and 
“G fails”, respectively. The validity of this interpretation is shown by the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 3.4, Let ( P, G) be a derivation pair where P = ( D, N ). Then 
1. PI-,G=-PI$G. 
2. PI-,G*Pt+,G. 
PROOF. We proceed by simultaneous induction on the depth of the O-proof and 
O-denial for P ~~ G and P kf G. In the base case, the sequent is initial and, hence 
G is just an atom A. 
1. Because P ++ A is initial, we have that A E IDI, and so because A aA, it is 
not the case that VB E I DI B #A, and by Proposition 3.1 it is not the case that 
PI-~ A. 
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2. Because P +- A is initial, we have that VB E IDI, B $A and VG 2 B E IDi, 
B $A, and so because A aA, we must have A E IDI and 3 G IA E IDI, and 
so by Proposition 3.1 it is not the case that P Fs A. 
Hence the induction hypothesis is that the proposition holds for all derivation 
states whose O-proof or O-denial is no more than a given depth. 
There are seven cases, and again we only present the argument for the cases A 
and VxG; the others are similar. 
A: 1. P t, A - 3G XA E IDI such that PI-~ G, and by the hypothesis it is 
not the case that P ~~ G. Hence, it is not the case that VB E IDIB gjrA 
and VG 2 B E IDI such that B aA we have P kf G, and by Proposi- 
tion 3.1 it is not the case that P ~~ A. 
2. Pt, A-VBEIDI, B$A and VG 1 B E IDI such that B aA, we 
have P kf G. Now as A a A, we must have that A P IDI. Also, by the 
hypothesis it is impossible that 3G IA E IDI such that P b-S G, and so 
it is impossible that PI-, A. 
VxG: 1. P ~~ VxG iff 3R ES’(%) such that P t, G[t/x] for all t E R, and by 
Proposition 3.2, P ks G[t/x] for all t E Z!, as no variables of R appear 
free in P. By the hypothesis this implies that it is not the case that 
P tf G[t/x] for any t E FY’, and so it is impossible that P kf G[t/xl for 
some t E k?!, i.e., it is not true that P ~~ VxG. 
2. P kf VxG iff P ~~ G[t/x] for some t E 2Y’, and by the hypothesis, this 
implies that it is not the case that P ~~ G[t/xl for some t E ‘Z. Now if 
3R EL%‘(SY) such that P +s G[t’/x] for all t’ E R, then by Proposition 
3.2, P ks G[t/x] for all t E Z! because no variables of R appear free 
in P. Hence, it is impossible that 3R ES%‘(Z!/) such that P ks G[t/xl 
for all t’ E R, i.e., it is not true that P k,VxG. 0 
Thus the definitions above are consistent. Note that a similar result will hold for 
the case when universal quantification is interpreted intensionally (i.e., using the 
new constant rule). 
This result suggests that it is consistent to define a more general form of 
negation. If we let G be a goal in which all predicates that occur in positive 
positions are in den(N) and all those in negative positions are in ass(N), then we 
may define an extension of the relations I-~ and t--f as follows: 
l PF, TG iff PI-~ G. 
l Pk-,7 G iff Pk,G. 
From the preceding result we see that P ~~ G implies that P t+, G, and so 
Pt-_, 7 G is a consistent conclusion. A similar argument holds for the other case, 
and so this indicates how we may implement negation for a wider class of formulae 
than just atoms. 
4. A KRIPKE-LIKE MODEL 
Having established a proof-theoretic notion of consequence, we now turn to finding 
a corresponding model-theoretic notion. In [14] it was shown how a Kripke-like 
model may be constructed for a large fragment of hereditary Harrop formulae, 
being the class of programs in which universal quantifiers are not allowed in goal 
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formulae, using techniques inspired by the possible worlds approach of Kripke [17]. 
This construction was then shown to precisely model the computational behaviour 
of these formulae, just as the previous construction of Kowalski and van Emden [3] 
did for Horn clauses. We now look at how to extend the construction of [14] to 
cater for the inclusion of negation and the inclusion of our notion of universally 
quantified goals. 
We wish to extend the programs and goals covered by this model to D,,,_ and 
G HHF - formulae. The key technical features of the Kripke-like model of [14] are a 
set of worlds %‘” together with a partial order on this set, and a consequence 
relation Il= that relates interpretations, worlds, and goals, i.e., we have I, w II= G 
for some interpretation I, world w, and goal G. In [14], worlds are just programs, 
and the partial ordering on them is set inclusion. It is then shown how to construct 
an interpretation .Z such that .Z, P li= G iff P kO G. 
In our case, we wish to alter the definition of li= to include cases for universal 
quantification and negation. Using the notion of truth in a Kripke model as a 
guide, we desire something along the lines of 
I, P II= VxG iff VW’ 2 P we have I, w’ Ii= G[ t/x] for each t E %. 
It should be noted that a feature of the Kripke-like model that is not a general 
feature of Kripke models is that the “domain” of terms considered does not change 
from world to world, but is constant for all worlds. Hence, we prefer to think of the 
Kripke-like model as one in which there are no new objects constructed in the 
process of increasing our knowledge (i.e., as we move upward in the partial order 
on worlds). It is this possibility that necessitates the side conditions on the 
definitions of truth in a Kripke model for the connectives V, 1, and 7 that state 
that the formula must not only be true in the current world but also true in every 
future world, because these are the ones that will be affected if new objects are 
constructed at a later stage. The worlds structure of [14] may be thought of as 
circumventing this side condition for 1 due to the fact that the partial order 
between worlds is just set inclusion. Analogously, because we will never construct 
new objects, it should be possible to do the same for V, so that we may replace the 
preceding definition by 
I, P I= VxG iff Z, P IF G[t/x] for all t E %. 
We do not need to consider all worlds w’ 2 P here because we know that no 
new objects can be constructed, and so the Herbrand universe YY is never 
increased. 
A relevant observation at this point is that there are intermediate logics (i.e., 
strictly between intuitionistic logic and classical logic) that have model-theoretic 
properties very similar to that of the Kripke-model. The best known example is 
called the logic of constant domains, whose models are characterized by Kripke 
models in which the terms “available” are the same at every world. Clearly the 
Kripke-like model is one such model, because 22 is fixed for all worlds. However, 
the logic of constant domains is not quite right in our case, because we are 
interested in one particular domain, rather than a class of domains. Another 
classification of the logic of constant domains is to add the following axiom to 
intuitionistic logic: 
HEREDITARY HARROP FORMULAE 17 
where x does not occur free in 4. It should be noted that for a program P and a 
goal of the form Vx(G, v G,(x)), where x is not free in G,, that P t-, Vx(G, V 
G,(x)) iff P ~~ G, v VxG,(x). However, clearly this rule cannot be directly applied 
to definite formulae, because such formulae do not contain positive occurrences of 
disjunctions. Nevertheless, this suggests that the natural place to study the seman- 
tics seems to be an intermediate logic, rather than intuitionistic logic. This point is 
taken up in another paper [8]. 
The way to define the condition for truth of a negated atom in this model is 
more problematic. The desired definition of tt= for negated formulae, again using 
the analogy of Kripke models, would be 
I, P k= A iff VW’ 2 P we have I, w’ w A. 
If the relation I between worlds is set inclusion cc), then there is no w and A 
such that J,w lb 7A [for any “reasonable” interpretation J, i.e., one in which if 
A E P, then A E J(P)]. The reason is that the world w U {A} is always reachable 
from W, and so there is always a world w’ above w such that J, w’ EA. Thus in 
order to incorporate negated atoms into this model, we need to restrict the 
reachability relation between worlds, so that there are less worlds “above” a given 
world W. 
It is not hard to see that such “pruning” will be based around completely 
defined predicates, in that no world above another world can extend the definitions 
of the completely defined predicates. Hence, we wish the reachability relation 
between worlds to reflect the following: 
w U {D) is reachable from w iff D does not contain any more information than 
w about the completely defined predicates of W. 
The notion of completely and incompletely defined predicates is used to deter- 
mine which worlds are reachable and which are not. If P contains an incompletely 
defined predicate p, then we wish any world that extends the definition of p to be 
reachable from P. On the other hand, any world that extends the definition of a 
completely defined predicate of P should not be reachable from P. 
As discussed previously, the partial order on these worlds will need to be 
something more restrictive than set inclusion. The natural partial order between 
worlds follows. 
Definition 4.1. Let P, and P, be sets of definite formulae, and Ni c names(Pii) x 
names(lq), i = 1,2. Then (P,,N,) I (P,,N,) iff: 
1. P, CP,. 
2. ass<N,l c ass<&). 
3. den(N,) c den(N,). 
4. For each C E P2 \P,, name(head(C)) E as&V,). 
The fourth condition in the definition of I is the interesting one, because it 
ensures that no completely defined predicate of P, is extended by P2. Recall that 
ass(N,) n den(N,) = 0, and so the only permitted extensions are those that extend 
the definitions of predicates that are known to be incompletely defined. 
For example, let P, be the two clauses for append given previously, and let 
P, = P, U {append(nil, nil, [l, 2111. The partial order for (Pi, (N, 0)) and 
(P,, (N,Iappend)), i = 1,2, is given in Figure 1. 
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(P2, PY w 
FIGURE 1. The append program and its possible extensions. 
Note that 
(P,,(N,~ZI)) I (P2,<N,{appendl))9 
but that 
(P,,(N,{append})) $ (&W,IappenW- 
Thus our partial order restricts the reachable worlds to those that do not extend 
the completely defined predicates, and in which incompletely defined predicates 
remain incompletely defined. 
Give this partial order, we know that all worlds above a given world w are those 
that consistently extend w, and so we know that if -J is true at world w, then 1~4 
will be true for all worlds w’ above w. 
5. INTERPRETATIONS AND CONSEQUENCE 
An important technical difference between our construction and that of [141 is that 
in our case we require three-valued interpretations [4] in order to specify what is 
true and what is false. Due to the possible occurrence of free variables in programs 
and goals, we also need to consider maps that range over sets of atoms that are not 
necessarily ground. In this way our construction will resemble that of [5]. As 
mentioned in [5], it seems uureasonable for p(x) to be true and p(a) to be false. 
We may circumvent this difficulty by thinking of the ground instances of the atoms 
in the interpretation as the “real” items of interest, and the nonground atoms as 
place holders. This leads us to the following definition of an interpretation. Let 2’ 
be the set of all atomic formulae. Let YY be the set of all derivation states. 
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Definition 5.1. Let X be a set of atoms. We refer to the set of all instances of all 
elements of X as inst(X). Note that XC inst(X). 
We define X, +X, as inst(X,) c inst(X,). When X, is a singleton set {A] we 
will often write X, + X, as A < X,. 
Let P be a derivation state. An interpretation is any function I: W-8” X2 
satisfying the following conditions, where Z(P) = (S, F): 
1. inst(S) n inst(F) = 0. 
2. For all worlds wl,wz such that wi I w2, where Z(w,) = (S,, F,) and Z(w,) = 
(S,,F,),wehaveS,<S, and F,+F,. 
Let Z(w) = (S, F). We define pos(ZXw) = S and neg(ZXw) = F. We define 
I, (w) = (0,0ZI)vw E 3K 
We think of pas(Z) as specifying which atoms are true and of neg(Z) as 
specifying which atoms are false. Thus, we may think of the definition of an 
interpretation given in [14] as the special case of our definition obtained when 
neg(ZXw) = 0 for any world w. The first condition ensures that no atom is 
specified as being both true and false, and so this condition ensures that interpreta- 
tions are internally consistent. The second condition is a generalization of the 
previous condition of internal monotonicity. This is justified by the perception that 
as programs increase, the knowledge contained in the program cannot decrease, 
and so no extension to a program is allowed to decrease either the set of atoms 
known to be true or the set of atoms known to be false. Thus we preserve the 
principle of monotonicity of information. 
We use the relation -C merely as a shorthand; this is a device that allows us to 
handle the nonground atoms more easily. 
It is not hard to define the usual partial order c on interpretations and the 
operator n . The dual operator u provides a slight difficulty because there is now 
no longer one maximal interpretation. This means that the obvious definition of I- 
may not lead to an interpretation, because if Zi(w) = (Si, Fi), where i = 1,2, then 
if ins@,) n inst(F,) # 0 or inst(S,) fl inst(l;,) # 0, the mapping (I1 LIZ,)(W) = 
(S, U S,, F, U F, > is not an interpretation as inst(pos(Z, LJ Z,)(w)) n 
inst(neg(Z, u Z,)(w)) # 0. However, we may consider two interpretations I, and Z2 
with this property as mutually inconsistent, and so we never wish to consider the 
mapping I, U Z2 as an interpretation. This consideration motivates the following 
definitions: 
Definition 5.2. Let I,, Z, be interpretations. I, and Z2 are mutually consistent 
interpretations if for all worlds w we have 
inst(pos( Z,)(w)) fl inst(neg( Z2)( w)) = 0, 
inst(neg( Zi)( w)) n inst(pos( Z,)( w)) = 0. 
Otherwise, I, and Z2 are mutually inconsistent. 
We define the relations 5 and c and the operator n as follows: 
Z,(w) I Z,(w) iff pos(Z,Xw) + pos(Z,Xw) and neg(Z,Xw) + neg(Z,Xw). 
I, cZ, iff VW EW we have Z,(w) <Z,(w). 
(Ii n Z*)(w) = (inst(pos(Z,)(w)) n inst(pos(Z,Xw)), inst(neg(Z,Xw)) n 
inst(neg(Z,Xw>)). 
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If I, and Z, are mutually consistent then we define the operator u as 
(4 W)(w) = (~os(Zi)W upos(Z,)(w),neg(Z,)(w) uneg(Z2DW 
In this case, the interpretations do not form a lattice under the operations u 
and fl because there are an infinite number of maximal interpretations. For any 
two such maximal interpretations I, and Z2 with Z,(P) = (S,,2Y’ \S, ) and Z,(P) = 
(S,,S?‘\S, ) such that S, # S,, then I, u Z2 is not an interpretation. However, it 
will be seen in what follows that the formal results do not depend upon the 
interpretations forming a lattice, and so this will not be a problem. 
Now we come to the generalization of the relation IF defined in [14]. Because 
there is both positive and negative information explicitly given in an interpretation, 
it seems natural to define two relations lt=+ and IF- such that I!==+ is used for 
the positive information and II=- for the negative information. 
Definition 5.3. Let (P, G) be a D,,,_ derivation pair where P = (D, N) and let Z 
be an interpretation. Then 
l z,Pk+ 
l Z,Pk=+ 
l z,Pk+ 
l z,PIk+ 
l z,Pk+ 
l z,PIb+ 
A iff A + pos(ZXP). 
+l iff A < neg(Z)(P). 
G, V G, iff I, Plb+ G, or I, PIb+ G,. 
G, A G, iff I, P lb+ G, and I, P lb+ G,. 
3xG iff I, P II=+ G[t/x] for some t E %. 
VxG iff 3R ES?(FY) such that I, P I!=’ G[t/x] for all t E R, where 
the variables in R do not appear free in P or G. 
l Z,(D,N)IF+D’XG iff Z,(DU(D’),N)It=+G and (DU{D’},N)l 
(D, N). 
l I, P Ik- A iff A < neg(ZXP). 
l I, P Ike 7A iff A + pas(Z)(P). 
l I, P IF- G, V G, iff I, P IF- G, and Z, P Ik- G,. 
l I, P IF:- G, A G, iff Z, P IF G, or I, P lb- G,. 
l I, P IE- 3xG iff 3R l 9(‘2Y) such that I, P IF:- G[t/x] for all t E R, where 
the variables in R do not appear free in P or G. 
l I, P lb- VxG iff I, P lb- G[t/x] for some t E 2Y. 
l I, (D, N) I@- D’ 1 G iff I, (D U ID’}, N) lb- G and (D U ID’), N) 2 
CD, N). 
It should be clear that these definitions are similar to those of [141, with the 
main differences being the cases for universal quantification, implication, and 
negation. The motivation for the universal quantification case is clear from the 
earlier discussion on the corresponding operational definition. In the case of 1141, 
the side condition on implication is vacuously true because D U ID’] 2 D. Here we 
explicitly require that (D u (D’], N > be reachable from (D, N), i.e., that the new 
world is reachable from the first. This may be thought of as ensuring that the 
assumption makes sense. This restriction is not strictly necessary, in that there may 
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be weaker restrictions that work. However, this is a safe choice, and in our opinion 
a natural one. 
One interesting thing to note is that given two interpretations I, and Z2, we 
have that I, C_ Z2 iff for all P and A we have I,, P 1~’ A =. Z2, P IL+ A and 
I,, Pk+ -lA *zz, PIk+ 7A. This property will be useful in some subsequent 
proofs because it allows us to deduce that if I,, P II=’ G * Z,, P It=+ G for any P 
and G, then I, c Z2. 
The following lemma establishes that interpretations respect the reachability 
relation between worlds. 
Lemma 5.1. Let P, and PI be D,,,_ derivation states, let G be a G,,,_ goal 
formula, and let Z be an interpretation. Zf P, s P2, then 
1. I, P, lk+ G *I, PI I#+ G. 
2. I, P, IK- G -I, P2 IF- G. 
PROOF. We proceed by induction on the size of G. The base case occurs when G is 
a literal. 
A: 1. 
2. 
-IA: 
I, P, #+ A implies that A 4 pos(ZxP,), and because inst(pos(Z(P,))) 
c_ inst(pos(ZCP,))), we have I, P2 IF=’ A. 
I, P, lb- A implies that A 4 neg(Z)(P,), and because inst(neg(Z(P,))) 
C inst(neg(Z( P2 )I>, we have I, P2 IF A. 
Because I, P Ik+ 7A iff I, P I@- A and I, P Ii=+ A iff I, P IF:- ~4, 
this case follows directly from the preceding case. 
Hence we assume that the lemma is true for all goals of no more than a given size. 
There are five cases: four of them are similar, and so we only present the argument 
for the cases G, V G, and D 3 G. 
G, v G,: 1. 
2. 
D’xG: 1. 
2. 
I, P, II=’ G, v G, iff I, P, Ik+ G, or I, P, II=+ G, and by the hy- 
pothesis this implies that I, Pz Ii=+ G, or I, P2 I!=’ G,, i.e., I, P2 
II=+ G, v G,. 
I, P, II=- G, v G, iff I, P, IK;- G, and I, P, IF- G, and by the 
hypothesis this implies that I, P2 lb- G, and I, P2 Ik- G,, i.e., 
I, P2 IL;- G, v G,. 
Z,(D,,N,) I++ D’IG iff Z,(D, U(D’),N,) IL+ G and (DI U 
{D’}, NI > 2 ( D, , Nl > , and so names(heads(D’)) c ass( Nr >. Now be- 
cause (D,, NI > I (D,, N2 >, this implies that names(heads(D’)) c
ass(N,> and, hence, names(heads(D’)) n den(N,) = 0, i.e., (D, U 
ID’}, NI> 5 (D, U {D’), N2). Hence by the hypothesis we have 
I, (D, u (D’j, N2 > I!=+ G, and names(heads(D’)) c ass( N2), and so 
Z,(D2,N2) II=+ D’xG. 
I, (D,, NI> IF- D’ 3 G iff I, (DI U {D’), Nr> IF- G and (D, U 
{D’), N,) 2 (D,, N,), and so names(heads(D’)) c ass(N,). Now be- 
cause (D,, Nr > I (D,, N, >, this implies that names(heads(D’)) c 
ass(N,) and, hence, names(heads(D’)) fl den(N,) = 0, i.e., (Dl U 
{D’), NI> 4 (D, U {D’), N2). Hence, by the hypothesis we have 
I, CD2 U {D’}, N2) IF- G, and names(heads(D’)) E ass(NJ and so 
Z,(D,,N,)w- D’xG. 0 
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Note that this result depends critically on the fact that if P, I P2, then 
ass(N,) L a&N,). It is difficult to see how such a result could hold in the absence 
of this property. 
It is easy to prove a lemma analogous to Lemma 2 of [141. 
Lemma 5.2. Let ( P, G) be a D,,,_ derivation pair where P = (D, N) and let I, 
and I2 be two interpretations. Then: 
1. I, E I2 iff VP VGZ,, P lb+ G * I*, P Il=+ G. 
2. I, c I2 iff VP VGI,, P IF- G - I,, P IF:- G. 
In light of Proposition 3.2, it should not be surprising that the following lemma 
holds. 
Lemma 5.3. Let (P, G) be a derivation state and let I be an interpretation. Then: 
1. I, P IE+ G - I, P It=’ G[t/x] for any t E FY. 
2. I, P IL- G - I, P IF- G[t/x] for any t E %. 
Next we show that interpretations conserve the consistency of E=+ and IF- . 
Lemma 5.4. Let I be an interpretation. Then there is no derivation pair (P, G) such 
that 
I,Pll=+ G and I,PlF- G 
The next lemma is important for the construction process and may be easily 
established. 
Lemma 5.5. Let I, and I, be interpretations. 
l If I, c I,, then I, and I2 are mutually consistent. 
l If I, and I2 are mutually consistent, then I, U I2 is an interpretation. 
l If I, L Z2, then I, U I, is an interpretation. 
l If I, and I, are mutually consistent, then I, L I, LI I, and I2 c I, LI 12. 
Another important lemma, again similar to one in [14], follows. 
Lemma 5.6. Let I, c I, L I3 c e-0 be an increasing sequence of interpretations and let 
(P,G) be a Dnn,_ derivation pair where P = ( D, N ). 
1. If u izl I,, P ok+ G, then 3k 2 1 such that I,, P II=’ G. 
2. If u i=, I,, P IF- G, then 3k 2 1 such that Ik, P Ik- G. 
PROOF. Note that l_/ FE 1 Ii is an interpretation by Lemma 5.5. Let I,(P) = (Si, Fj). 
We proceed by induction on the structure of G. 
1. If G is an atom A and l-l y= 1 Ii, P II=+ A, then A < tJ := 1 Si, and because A 
is an instance of itself, A E inst(lJ y= 1 Si> = U YE 1 inst(Si). Hence, 3k such 
that A E ins&S,), and so inst(A) c ins@,), which implies that A -C S,, i.e., 
Ik, PI@+ A. 
If G is -A and U y= 1 Ii, P N=+ -YA, then A -C U 7X 1 Fj, and because A is an 
instance of itself, A E inst( lJ y=, Fi) = LJ y= 1 inst(Pi). Hence, 3k such that 
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A E i&F,), and so inst(A) L insO,), which implies that A -C Fk, i.e., Zk, P 
It=+ 74. 
2. As I, PIti- A iff I, PIE+ 4 and I, PI!=- ~4 iff I, P II=’ A, this follows 
from the preceding argument. 
Hence the inductive hypothesis is that the lemma holds for all goals of no more 
than a given size. There are five cases, most of which are similar, and so we only 
present the argument for the cases 3xG and D 3 G. 
3xc’: 1. 
2. 
D’IG’: 1. 
2. 
Note that 
Because U T= 1 I,, PI!=+ 3xG’, we have that U T=, Z,, P Ii=’ G’[x/tl 
for some t E FY. By the hypothesis, Zk, P lk+ G’[x/t] for some k 2 1, 
and so we have Zk, P IF+ 3xG’. 
Because U ;=I I,, PIE- 3xG’, we have that 3R ES’(~YO such that 
U F= 1 I,, P lb- G’[x/tl for all t E R, and so by the hypothesis, for 
each t E R there is a k, such that Zk,, P I+- G’[t/x]. Let k be the 
maximum of all the k,. Hence Zk, P IF- G’[t/x] for all t E R, and so 
we have Z,, P IL- 3xc’. 
Because UT=,Z,,(D,N)I~+D’~,,~~ have that U:=,Z,,(Du 
{D’}, N) lt=;’ G’. By the hypothesis, Zk, (D u {II’}, N) II=+ G’ for some 
k21,andsowehaveZ,,(D,N)1F+D’3G’. 
Because UT=,Z,,<D,N)I~-D’~G’, we have that U~=,Z,,(DU 
(II’}, N) Ik- G’. By the hypothesis, Zk, (D U (II’), N) I@- G’ for some 
kz 1, and so we have Zk,(D,N) IF- D’IG’. 0 
this result depends critically on the compactness properties of goals .” 
containing quantiners. 
Thus our extended notion of interpretation preserves important semantic prop- 
erties. We show in the next section how the important properties of the r”(Z,> 
construction are preserved as well. 
6. A FIXED POINT CONSTRUCTION 
We wish to find a single interpretation J such that PI-~ G iff J, P Il=+ G and 
P kf G iff .Z, P lk- G. We proceed in a similar manner to that in [14], i.e., we build 
ordinal powers of a T operator and use the union of all such powers to produce the 
desired interpretation. 
Definition 6.1. Let Z be an interpretation and let w = (D, N) be a DHHF_ 
derivation state. Then we define 
pos(T(z))(w) = (AI-4 EIDI or 3G XA E JDI such that Z,w lt=’ G] , 
nedT(O)(w) = {Al name(A)Eden(N)andVBEJDIB$AandVG3B 
E (D(such that B aA we have Z,w IK- G}, 
T”(Z) = i;I T’(Z). 
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For an example of how this process works, consider the program 
even( 0) 
Vx even( s( x)) C 7even( x). 
Let P = (D, (0, {even))), where D is the code in the foregoing even program. 
Then we have 
T’(Z,)(P) = <{even(o)},0a> 
T*(L)(P) = (1 even(O)}, {even( s(O))} > 
T3(L)(P) = (I even(O),even(s*(O))},{even(s(O))}) 
T4(Z,)(P) = ({ even(0),even(s2(O))},{even(s(O)),even(s3(0))}) 
. . . 
Note that even(x) neither succeeds nor fails because there are some instances 
of it that succeed and some that fail. 
In this way we may think of the powers of T as using the program to define an 
increasing sequence of interpretations that is used to model the behaviour of the 
program. The final interpretation in this sequence [i.e., T”(Z, >] can indeed be 
shown to capture this operational behaviour. 
It is not hard to show that T is indeed a mapping from interpretations to 
interpretations, i.e., that if Z is an interpretation, then so is T(Z). 
Thus the construction gives us an increasing sequence of interpretations. It is 
also not hard to show that T is monotonic and continuous. 
Lemma 6.1. Let Z1 and I, be interpretations. Then 
Z, &Z, * T(Z,) r T(Z,) 
PROOF. Let P be a DHHF_ derivation state. 
If A E pos(T(Z,))(P), then A E IDI or 3G 3,A E (DI such that I,, PI!=’ G, and 
by Lemma 5.2 we have that Z,, P k’ G, and so A E pos(T(Z,)XP). 
If A E neg(T(Z,))(P), then name(A) E den(N) and VB E IDIB $A and VG 3 
B E (DI such that B aA, I,, P I@- G, and by Lemma 5.2 we have that Z2, 
P lk;- G, and so A E neg(T(Z,)XP). 
Hence T(Z,) L TCZ,). q 
Lemma 6.2. Let I, c I, E -1. be an increasing sequence of interpretations. Then 
PROOF. 
c : Zj c_ u FE, Z,, and so by Lemma 6.1, we have that T(Zj) C_ T( u YE i Zi> for 
any j, and hence l-l T= 1 T(Zi) E T( l-l F=, Zi>. 
2 : If A E pos(T( U r= 1 Z,))(P), then either A E IDI, in which case A E T(Zj)(P) 
for all j r 0, or 3G 3A E 1 D( such that U y=, Zj, P IK+ G, which by Lemma 
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5.6 implies that Zj, P lt=+ G for some j 2 0, and so A E pos(S(Z,))(P). In 
either case we have A E pos( l-l T=, T(Z,))(P). 
If A E neg(T( l-l y=, Z,))(P), then name(A) E den(N) and VB E IDIB $A 
andVGxBBlDJsuchthat BaA, u~=,Z,,Pl~~ G,whichbyLemma5.6 
implies thatrZj, P IF- G for some j 2 0, and so A E neg(T(Zj))(P). Hence, 
A E neg( U i=, T(Z,))(P). 
Hence, T( l-l T= 1 I;> c U y=, T(Z,). 
Hence T( U T= 1 I,> = U F= 1 T(Z,). q 
Most importantly, the sequence of interpretations respects II=+ and lk- . 
Proposition 6.3. Let P be a D,,,_ derivation state and let G be a G,,,_ goal 
formula. Then 
1. Tk(Z,), P II=’ G - Tj(Z,), P IF+ G for any j 2 k. 
2. Tk(Z,>, P ok- G * Tj(Z,), P I!F G for any j 2 k. 
Thus our construction preserves important properties. In fact, it follows from 
the monotonicity of T and the fact that r is a chain-complete partial order that 
the least fixed point of T is T”(Z,) [l, ll’]. However, it is not hard to establish the 
same result directly, and because it is somewhat informative, we do so. 
Lemma 6.4. Let T be defined as before and so 
T”(Z,) = ii_1 T’(Z,) = T’(Z) u T*(Z,) u T3(Z,) u 3.. . 
Then T”(Z,) is aBedpoint of T, i.e., T(T”(Z,)) = T”(Z,). 
Lemma 6.5. Let J be any $?xed point of T. Then for any i 2 1, T’(Z,) c J. 
PROOF. Clearly, I, c J, and because T is monotonic, we have T(Z,) 5 T(J), and 
so T’(Z,) c T’(J). Now because J is a fixed point of T, we have that .Z = T(J) = 
T*(J)= . . . = T’(J), and so T’(Z,) c J. 0 
From this lemma we may easily derive the desired result: 
Proposition 6.6. T “( Z i ) is the least fixed point of T. 
Thus even though our partial order does not form a lattice, our operator is 
continuous and T “( Z I ) is its least fixed point. This result may be seen as evidence 
that our approach does not stray too wildly from the traditional methods. 
We now show the relationship between our construction and the relations I-, 
and hf . First we show that t-, and tf are sound with respect to the Kripke-like 
model. 
The reader may wish to refer to Definition 2.4. 
Proposition 6.7. Let ( P,G) be a DHHFp derivation pair where P = ( D, N > . Then 
1. PI--, G - T”(Z,), PIN+ G. 
2. Zf G is negatable, then P Ff G - TYZ,), P IF- G. 
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Note that the restriction in 2 is necessary. Because T”(Z,) is an interpretation, 
enlarging the program must preserve what is known to be true and what is known 
to be false. On the other hand, enlarging a program may mean that a goal that 
originally failed does not fail in the larger program. 
PROOF. We proceed by induction on the depth of the O-derivation of G. The base 
case occurs when G is an atom A and the sequent P ++ A (resp. P --- A) is 
initial. 
1. Because the sequent is initial, we have A E IDI. Hence, A E pos(T’(Z,)XP), 
and so T”(Z,), P pi=+ A. 
2. Because the sequent is initial, we have VB E IDI and VG 3) B E IDI B 4 A and 
because A is negatable, we have name(A) E den(N). Hence, A E 
neg(T’(Z.))(P), and so T”(Z,), PIE- A. 
Hence we assume that the proposition is true for all O-derivations of no more than 
a given depth. There are seven cases. Because many of these are similar, we only 
present the 
A: 1. 
2. 
-,A: 1. 
2. 
DIG: 1. 
2. 
argument for the cases A, TA, and D 3 G. 
If the base case does not hold, we have that 3G XA E IDI such that 
P bs G, and by the hypothesis this implies that T”(Z,), P lb+ G. By 
Lemma 5.6 we have that Tk(Z,), PI!=+ G for some k, and so 
Tk”(Z1), PIF’ A, i.e., T”‘(Z,), PIF+ A. 
If the base case does not hold, we have that VB E I DIB c# A, and 
VG 13 B E I DI such that B a A, P F-~ G, and because G is negatable, 
by the hypothesis, T”(Z,), P IF:- G. By Lemma 5.6 we have that 
Tk(Z,>, P I@- G for some k, and so Tk+‘(Z,), P lb- A, i.e., TYZ,), P 
lb- A. 
PFS 7A iff P I--~ A and name(A) E den(N), and by the hypothesis, 
T”(Z,), PIN- A. By Lemma 5.6, we have that Tk(Z,), Plk- A for 
some k, and so Tk(Z,>, PI!=’ TA, i.e., T”(Z,), PI@+ 1A. 
P% 7A iff P t-, A, and by the hypothesis, TYZ,), P lb+ A. By 
Lemma 5.6, we have that Tk(Z,>, PIN+ A for some k, and so 
Tk(Z,),PIK lA, i.e., T”(Z,),PIF- 1A. 
(D, N) t-, D’ I G iff (D u {II’}, N) t, G and names(heads(D’)) c
ass(N), and so by the hypothesis T”(Z,), CD U {D’), N) It=+ G, i.e., 
T”(Z,), (D, N) lb+ D’ 1 G. 
(D, N) kf D’ I G iff (D u {D’), N) tf G and names(heads(D’)) c
ass(N), and because D’ I G is negatable, G is negatable, and so by 
the hypothesis T”(ZL),(DU{D’),N)lk- G, i.e., T”(Z,),(D,N) lb- 
D’IG. 0 
Note that this result may be thought of as demonstrating the compactness of Fs 
and E~, in that if Pl-, G, then TYZ,), PIN+ G, and by Lemma 5.6, Tk(Z,), 
P II=+ G for some k, and similarly for kf when G is negatable. 
Next we show that operational provability is complete with respect to the 
Kripke-like model. 
Proposition 6.8. Let ( P, G > be a DHHF- derivation pair where P = (D, N >. Then 
1. T”(Z,), P IK+ G *P t-s G. 
2. T”(Z,), PIF- G d Pi-, G. 
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PROOF. By Lemma 5.6 we have that 
T”(Z,), P lb+ G * 3k such that Tk(Z,), P IF+ G, 
T”(Z,), PIN- G - 3k such that Tk( I,), P IF- G. 
In each case, let k be the smallest such number. 
We proceed to show 1 and 2 simultaneously by formal induction on the ordinal 
measure w.k + n, where n is the number of connectives in G. 
The base case occurs when n = 1 and k = 0: 
. T’(Z,), PI!=’ A implies that A -X IDl, i.e., A E IDI, and hence P t--s A. 
. T’(Z,), P lb- A implies that VB E IDI and VG 3 B E IDI, B $A, and so 
PI-, A. 
Hence we assume that the proposition is true for all programs and goals for which 
w-k + n does not exceed a certain value. 
There are seven cases. As before, these cases are somewhat repetitive, so we 
only give the argument for the cases A, -IA, and D 2 G. 
A: 1. 
2. 
7A: 1. 
2. 
D’IG: 1. 
2. 
Tk(Z,), PI!=+ A implies that 3G XA E IDI such that Tk-‘(I,>, PIb+ G, 
and by the hypothesis, P ~~ G, and so P Fs A. 
Tk(Z,), PIE- A implies that VB E IDlB $A and VG IB EIDI such that 
B a A, we have Tkpl(Zl), P pi=- G, and by the hypothesis, P kf G, and so 
PI-~ A. 
Tk(Z,>, PIE+ 7A implies that Tk(Z,), Plb- A, and so VB E IDIB $A 
and VG 3 B E IDI such that B aA, Tk-‘(Z,), P 1~~ G and name(A) E 
den(N). By the hypothesis this implies that P ~~ A and name(A) E 
den(N), i.e., P Es 7A. 
Tk(Z,), Plk- -IA implies that Tk(Z,), PI!=+ A, and so 3GxA EIDI 
such that Tk-‘(Zl), P Il=’ G. By the hypothesis this implies that P Fs A, 
and so P t--f 7A. 
Tk(Z,), (D, N) lb+ D’ 1 G iff Tk(Z,), (D U {D’}, N) Ik+ G and (D U 
{D’), N) 2 (D, N), and by the hypothesis this implies that (D U ID’}, N) 
+s G and names(heads(D’)) G ass(N), i.e., (D, N) ks ZY 1 G. 
Tk(Z,), (D,N) IF- D’ IG iff Tk(Z,), (D U {D’},N) lb:- G and (D U 
(D’}, N) 2 (D, N), and by the hypothesis this implies that (D U (D’), N) 
~~ G and names(heads(D’)) c ass(N), i.e., (D, N) ~~ D’ 1 G. 0 
We now come to the main theorem. 
Theorem 6.9. Let P = ( D, N > be a D,,,_ derivation state and let G be a G,,,- 
goal formula. Then: 
1. P F-~ G - T”(Z,), P lb+ G. 
2. If G is negatable, then P Ed G * T”(Z,), P IL- G. 
3. PI-~ G e T”(Z,), PI+- G. 
PROOF. Follows directly from Propositions 6.7 and 6.8. 0 
28 J. HARLAND 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
We have seen how the NEGATION as FAILURE rule may be incorporated into 
the framework of hereditary Harrop formulae and how this extension is more 
intricate than in some other cases due to the possibility that the program may grow 
during execution. We have also seen how consideration of how to implement 
universal quantifiers in goals influences the technical choices to be made and how 
we may make both of these extensions compact. We have also seen how a 
Kripke-like model may be constructed in such a way that truth in the model 
corresponds to derivability from programs. The fact that this construction takes at 
most w iterations may be seen as evidence of the compactness of our approach. 
This property is essentially due to our treatment of nonground terms, in that we do 
not consider only the ground instances of a program, but all instances, including 
both ground and nonground ones. 
Whilst our notion of universal quantification has been extensional, it should not 
be hard to derive similar results for the intensional case. Indeed, given definitions 
of I--~ and I--~ that use the intensional version and corresponding alterations to 
Ik+ and IL;-, the results stated herein will, it seems, all still hold. Thus we may 
think of our approach, in this limited sense at least, as being parameterized by the 
choice of consequence relation. 
We have seen how inconsistencies, such as extending the definition of com- 
pletely defined predicates, causes some problems from the model-theoretic point of 
view, but the operational (or proof-theoretic) view does not have such problems. 
Whilst the notion of completely defined predicates seems natural enough, the 
corresponding restrictions on the operational concepts do not seem as natural. This 
suggests that our approach to model theory may need to become more sophisti- 
cated in order to deal with inconsistent programs. A similar remark may be made 
about extending the class of programs to include negations that occur positively in 
programs, such as in the “program” {p, up]. 
One feature of the Kripke-like model is that it naturally incorporates the notion 
of extensions to the program, and so it may be useful for studying the formal 
development of programs. Another interesting area of investigation is to use this 
model as a way of investigating the “natural” logic in which to interpret hereditary 
Harrop formulae. It is known that this logic is slightly stronger than intuitionistic 
logic [8]; the proof-theory of this logic is as yet somewhat unnatural, and so the 
Kripke-like model seems a likely way to investigate this logic. The main difference 
between this logic and intuitionistic logic is that we require the INDEPENDENCE 
of PREMISE (IP) axioms to hold. These axioms are often studied in conjunction 
with Murkov’s principle (MP) (which may be stated as 7 4 *A), which seems 
appropriate for NAF. Thus it would seem that the natural logic for hereditary 
Harrop formulae with NAF is the intermediate logic found by adding IP and MP to 
intuitionistic logic. This theme will be taken up in a later paper. 
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